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REVISING THE TORTS COURSE 
RICHARD S. MILLER* 
It is necessary, in order to evaluate the curricula of contemporary 
American law schools and to recommend changes or improvements therein, 
to have some feeling for the objectives to be served by law school educa-
tion. It might be possible to deal with problems of curriculum in vacuo 
if it were believed that there exists little or no relationship between its 
content and methodology, on the one hand, and the goals of legal educa-
tion, on the other, but presumably few legal educators have gone that far 
( or are that far gone! ). Indeed, it would be very difficult for law teachers 
to preserve their own self-respect if they did not believe that there exists 
a fairly close correlation between educational input and professional out-
put. Nevertheless, it is still possible to argue, with force, that the formal 
structure of the curriculum and the internal arrangement of a specific 
course are not nearly as important as the process of communication and 
intellectual stimulation that takes place inside the classroom during the 
moments of confrontation between teacher and students. To this I would 
demur, arguing that what goes on during this confrontation is often 
governed in large measure by the foreordained contents of an assigned 
casebook. Some great teachers may be capable of escaping the conceptual 
bounds of the casebook but most, I suspect, stick pretty closely to the 
materials between the covers. Under these circumstances the student can 
develop great analytical skill, but the range of his vision may be confined 
to the editor's own view of the scope of his materials, however narrow. 
Furthermore, I prefer to believe, with Professor Lefiar, that "taught 
law is tough law.m Not only are the ideas, doctrines and even the mistakes 
to which the student is exposed in law school durable-in the sense that 
they are likely to stay with him throughout his professional career-but 
so are the techniques of analysis and, especially, the interests which he 
develops. In this paper, therefore, I shall operate on the assumption that 
course content and other curricular considerations can significantly affect 
the achievement of law school objectives. 
Traditional views of the purpose of legal education center most 
heavily, of course, on the training of lawyer-practitioners-specialists 
who will spend their professional careers as advocates within domestic 
judicial and quasi-judicial arenas, or advisers and draftsmen who will 
base their advice or draftsmanship upon prediction of probable outcomes 
of possible litigation. Only infrequently is more than lip-service paid to the 
function of training judges, legislators, community leaders, administra-
tors, and bureaucrats, and then usually by the "first-class" law schools 
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1. Leflar, Taught Law is Tough Law, 8 WAYNE L. REv. 465 (1962). 
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(who, it is sometimes suggested, can carry off such high-sounding pro-
grams only because of the superior quality of their students). 
While it is true that the primary function of domestic lawyers is 
to play the traditional role of counselor and advocate, there are a number 
of facts and conditions whose existence (or likely existence) would seem 
to justify explicit expansion of law school objectives at all law schools to 
include the training of policy-makers.2 At the very top of the list is the 
explosive character of the interrelated problems of survival, subsistence, 
population, pollution, economics, ideology, education and health, just to 
name a few, which confront all societies and all levels of government, 
from local to supranational, today. Their magnitude and complexity re-
quire a heavy and regular flow of decision-makers and advisers competent 
to participate in the processes of decision in a manner which will move 
outcomes in directions likely to maximize the values of human dignity, and 
at a pace fast enough to avert the many disasters, major and minor, which 
impend. Next is the fact that in the United States the ranks of the law-
trained already provide a greater than proportionate share of community 
policy-makers and other participants in major decision-making processes.3 
Third, there is reason to believe that despite their ubiquitousness, the 
,contributions of the law-trained to effective problem-solving in this 
country has often been minimal, if not retrogressive.4 And lastly, of the 
large number of law-trained persons who participate in institutional 
processes having major effects on community values, a substantial pro-
portion receive their law-training in law schools other than those which 
purport explicitly to train community leaders. 
Placed in this perspective, a preferred general objective of law 
schools should be to train citizens who are capable of and willing, if not 
eager, to participate actively in community decision-making processes, 
and whose contribution to these processes will tend to maximize the 
society's preferred values, or at least not exacerbate existing problems. 
Hopefully, the law-training of community leaders and decision-
makers, if that were to become the predominant objective of law schools, 
would also provide the knowledge and skills required for effective "lawyer-
ing"-even more effective, perhaps, than that performed by graduates of 
schools whose sole objective is to turn out practitioners to serve the needs 
of the local community.5 In the first place, most legal educators have long 
2. See generally, Lasswell & McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional 
Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943). Readers of that article will discover 
that this paper is a faint echo of the clarion call issued by Professors Lasswell and McDougal 
over twenty-three years ago. This paper hardly reflects the fullness of their recommendations 
but nonetheless attempts to move in the direction they suggest. 
3. C/., Hacker, Domination of Congress by Lawyers, N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1964, § 6 
(Magazine), p. 14. 
4. Ibid. See also Colloquy, The Public Responsibility of the Academic Law Teacher, 14 
J. LEGAL ED. 109,,115 (1961). 
5. Ct., Jones, Objectives and Insights In University Legal Education, 11 OHIO ST. L.J. 
4,11 (1950). 
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recognized the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of training law students 
in the skills of courtroom advocacy, negotiation and counseling; it is 
widely believed that most of these skills are acquired more quickly and 
efficiently after graduation while undergoing the rigors of practice. At 
least that is the premise upon which the bulk of the curriculum of most 
law schools is based. Second, many of those law schools which purport 
to train practitioners place major emphasis on the process of judicialliti-
gation (mostly at the appellate level), leaving their graduates to fend for 
themselves in the "exotic" fields of administrative law, legislation and 
private ordering. Any expansion of law school objectives which required 
greater attention to these areas might well prove a boon to the bewildered 
graduate entering into practice. Third, the view that law can be taught 
by the case method alone without reference to the varied features of the 
fertile context in which decisions are spawned has long ago been debunked 
by experts,6 notwithstanding the fact that many casebook editors and a 
high proportion of law teachers still act as if the parade of appellate 
opinions could tell the whole story. Even Jerome Frank, who argued 
persuasively in favor of "lawyer schools," recognized the importance of 
the related study of disciplines other than "law.m Fourth, in order to be 
effective in performing their respective functions, both lawyers and 
leaders must understand the various and varied decision-making processes 
-how they operate as well as what they decide-and the complex of 
conditions which affect these processes.s In short, the law training of 
policy makers and the training of courtroom lawyers need not be sub-
stantially different; the emphasis on broader problems of policy and on 
relevant information from other disciplines required for the training of 
leaders might tend to upgrade the training of all.9 
Perhaps my view can be made more explicit by reference to a specific 
field, such as the law of torts. 
Presumably, the first year torts course, as currently conceived, serves 
two major functions: development of analytical skills needed by the 
lawyers-the so-called "legal mind"-and development of understanding 
of the doctrines and policies of torts and their application within the 
Anglo-American judicial process. The following generalizations about 
these two objectives will become relevant to this discussion: 
1. The lawyer skills, such as case and statute analysis, induc-
tion and deduction, policy analysis, criticism and prediction, 
are fungible among various fields. Once a law student has devel-
oped expertise in such skills he may apply them to fields of law 
6. C/., CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921); Pound, Mechanical 
Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 603 (1908); Holmes, The Path 0/ the Law, 10 HARV. L. 
REv. 457 (1897). 
7. Frank, A Plea jor Lawyer-Schools, 56 YALE L.J. 1303 (1947). 
8. Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 2 passim. 
9. Ibid. 
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other than torts. Conversely, if such skills are developed in other 
courses, they may be applied with equal effectiveness to torts. 
It seems to follow as well that if a student can be made to 
develop such skills within a narrow area within a specific field, 
he should be able to apply them with some success to other 
areas within the same field. Thus, there appears to be no neces-
sary relationship between the substance of a particular course 
and training in legal analysis. The reasoning skills of the lawyer 
could be taught even if torts (or some other substantive courses) 
were entirely excluded from the curriculum, or if only selected 
areas within the broader field were included.lO 
2. Few, if any, teachers can cover in depth the substance of all 
of the various subjects subsumed under the rubric of torts in the 
amount of time allotted for that course. Whether we address 
ourselves to the teaching of torts or to the entire curriculum, 
it must be conceded that vast amounts of relevant substance 
are never presented to the students. Indeed, it appears to be 
accepted policy, made explicit by permitting students to elect 
their own program in the second or third year or by omitting 
some subjects from the curriculum, not to make general coverage 
of all (or even most) areas of substantive law a prerequisite to 
graduation or practice. Decisions as to the substantive content 
and coverage of the curriculum and specific courses within it 
seem to be made on the basis of custom, existing teaching 
materials or the personal preference of the instructor and tend to 
serve rather general objectives, such as providing the student 
with a traditional background, selecting areas which he is likely 
to find useful in practice, fulfilling bar exam requirements or 
merely, as one honest colleague has suggested, analyzing and 
exploring interesting areas in the law.u 
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If there is validity to these generalizations, then the following recom-
mendations for reordering the torts course (suggestive for other courses 
as well) designed with the objective of educating better policy-makers, 
ought not to violate any vital precepts of legal education. 
1. SKILLS 
The intellectual tasks performed by the policy-maker do not differ 
in kind from the tasks performed by the practicing lawyer, but only in 
emphasis and scope. To borrow from Professors"Lasswell and McDougal, 
10. This is not to suggest that some areas, such as torts, are not better vehicles for 
teaching lawyer skills to neophytes than others. 
11. But cf., Strong, A New Curriculum For the College of Law of the Ohio State 
University, 11 Omo ST. L.J. 44, 51-2 (1950). The current trend at the College of Law is 
away from the thoroughly planned curriculum discussed in the 1950 article; practically all 
courses in the second and third years are now offered on an elective basis. Similar trends 
are found in the offerings of other laws schools. See, e.g., THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 
LAW SCHOOL ANNOUNCEMENT: 1966-67 and YALE LAW SCHOOL BULLETIN OF YALE UNIVER-
SITY, Aug., 1966. 
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those engaged in decision-making should perform five intellectual tasks 
if they hope to move the outcomes and effects of decisions in the direction 
of preferred goals. These tasks include (1) defining of goals in terms 
of values, (2) determination of relevant decisional trends through time, 
(3) examination of conditions in the society and human factors which will 
operate upon and affect decision-making in the future, (4) prediction 
of future relevant decisions in light of existing trends and applicable 
conditions and appraisal of those decisions in light of preferred goals and 
( 5) the framing of realistic alternatives of decisions which will tend to 
create effects consistent with the articulated goals.12 Without joining 
issue with the critics of "policy-science" who attack the detailed meth-
odology recommended by Lasswell and McDougal in the performance 
of the foregoing tasks, or who deride their sometimes complicated termi-
nology developed to avoid traditional ambiguity, it may be safely asserted 
that any intelligent participant in a decision-making process-whether 
a lawyer, a judge or a governmental policy-maker-must and will ap-
proximate the performance of all five tasks, consciously or unconsciously, 
systematically or haphazardly, in the performance of his functions. 
The major difficulty with the traditional torts course, however, is 
that the hangover from the days of formalistic jurisprudence still persists. 
Goal thinking, examination of conditioning factors and the framing of 
alternatives are apparently deemed largely to be beyond the concern of 
the lawyer; for all that appears the practitioner need only know how past 
decisions were arrived at in order to predict future decisions. True, no 
major casebook on torts is entirely devoid of materials dealing with 
underlying policies, with the revolution against common law tort im-
munities, with new ways of handling automobile accident claims or with 
the process of change as affecting the balance between court and legisla-
ture, but few of them include nondecisional materials sufficient to provide 
a sound basis for intelligent study of goals, conditions and alternativesP 
What policies should be served by the law of torts? What policies are 
being served? How effectively are current policies-e.g., deterrence, 
accident prevention, compensation, loss distribution, social insurance-
being served by existing doctrines? What social conditions will affect 
future decisions? In light of those conditions, how effective can existing 
institutions be in serving preferred policies? What changes, within and 
without the scope of exi~ting institutions and doctrine, will advance the 
goals properly to be served by the law of torts in a free society? 
All these questions, it is suggested, are appropriate for considera-
tion not only by community policy-makers, but also by practicing lawyers. 
12. McDougal & Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public 
Order, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1959) in McDOUGAL & ASSOCIATES, STUDms IN WORLD PUBLIO 
ORDER 3, 16-21 (1960). 
13. GREGORY & KALVEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS (1959) and SHULMAN & JAMES, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS (1952) seem to be better than other coursebooks in this 
regard. 
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The latter can hardly counsel effectively as professionals or otherwise 
serve their client's interests unless they are steeped in an understanding of 
the broader context in which their familiar judicial institution is operating. 
And even if they could, there is every reason why the range of their 
interests should be expanded by legal education to include the considera-
tion of and participation in the process upon which the society's future 
depends-the achievement of social justice within a framework of indi-
vidual liberties. 
Perhaps the kinds of materials and the kind of approach I would 
like to see adopted will be revealed by examination of one phase of a 
traditional area of torts study: "proximate cause-persons within the 
risk." In The Law of Torts by Seavey, Keeton and Keeton,14 the authors 
treat of this area. Their materials start with the majority and dissenting 
opinions in the Palsgraf case,15 and are followed by precis and excerpts 
from 37 additional appellate opinions. Apart from occasional references 
to law review articles or notes, no other materials appear.16 This parade 
of cases sets the stage for the exploration of the various doctrinal ap-
proaches to the problem to be examined/7 the ways in which the doctrines 
have been applied, the differences among rules applied by different courts, 
the consistency of their application, the limitations of the doctrines and 
the exceptions to general rules. Within this rather narrow framework the 
selected cases work well. A torts teacher can create student interest, if 
not excitement, by testing the students' intellectual mettle in under-
standing and analyzing the decisions and the curious concept of proximate 
cause itself. The difficulty, however, is that every law teacher knows (or 
ought to know) that "proximate cause" or "scope of duty"-have it 
either way-are merely doctrinal masks which conceal the difficult under-
lying issue : Under what circumstances will (or should) the law require 
defendant to pay for injuries to which his conduct contributed where the 
risk of injury to the plaintiff from such conduct was more remote than 
the risk to a third person who was more clearly within the "zone of 
danger?1I18 The resolution of this issue, notwithstanding the formulae 
14. Ch. 3, § 2 (1964). 
15. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). 
16. Of course these materials must be read in connection with other sections of the book 
dealing with duty and causation, but even these sections are practically devoid of non-case 
materials. Chapter 9, containing thirty-six pages devoted to "Stability and Change," are 
held by the authors to ·be "relevant to tort law generally,l, but the bulk of this chapter is 
also filled with judicial decisions. 
17. E.g., is the problem one of "duty" or "proximate cause"? 
18. Compare the restatement by Judge Learned Hand of the Palsgraf issue in Sinram 
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 61 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1932) in SEAVEY, KEETON & KEETON, THE LAW 
OF TORTS 370,371 (1964): 
[T]he point was whether, if A. omitted to perform a positive duty to B., C., who 
had been damaged in consequence, might invoke the breach, though otherwise A. 
owed him no duty; in short, whether A. was chargeable for the results to others 
of his breach of duty to B. 
For my purposes it doesn't much matter whether the issue is narrowly limited, as by 
Judge Hand, or stated more broadly, as in the text. 
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offered in the cases, is a problem requiring the decision-maker-judge or 
jury-to apply notions of justice and policy.19 The study of the cases in 
the Seavey casebook will unquestionably provide the student with the 
doctrinal tools-zone of risk, foreseeability, duty, proximate cause, direct 
and proximate, probable and natural, etc.-and their procedural con-
sequences. It may even help him to understand how these doctrines have 
been applied in prior decisions, and how they might be applied in future 
cases. But it is at its weakest in attempting to direct the students to 
think about the content and the effects of the underlying policies them-
selves, and it might even mislead the poor student, or the good student 
with a poor instructor, to believe that the doctrinal language has fixed 
content which can decide concrete cases. This is indeed unfortunate. If 
the only persons affected by the decision of a particular tort case were the 
immediate parties and if, as between themselves, any non-outlandish 
decision finally resolving the controversy were acceptable, then perhaps 
the underlying policy issues could be left entirely to the "practical 
politics" of the jury or the viscera of the judge. But our elaborate judicial 
structure would hardly be necessary if that were so; such disputes could 
be sent in the first instance to a lay panel with instructions to decide on 
the basis of "fairness." Rather, it is evident that the law of torts exists 
to serve specific community objectives and policies. If these are to be 
served effectively, they are properly subject to scrutiny and analysis by 
students who will be charged with their implementation in the future. 
In their study of proximate cause, therefore, the following tasks and 
materials should become relevant: 
1. Goals-In terms of specific values and specific policies, what 
goals are to be served by the doctrine of proximate cause? Here 
the materials included for study might range from scientific and 
philosophical views of causality through theological and ideo-
logical positions on the scope of private and public responsibility 
for the welfare of others. At this point goals which seem to 
conflict under present or past practices-such as rehabilitation 
of injured parties versus encouragement to industrial growth-
may be identified without resolving the conflict.20 
II. Trends of Decision-In addition to the leading tort cases, 
legislation and comparative law and criminal law materials 
dealing with proble~1' analogous to those subsumed under proxi-
mate cause might be' included to provide insights as to how the 
matter is handled in other areas.21 What factors have influenced 
19. C/., Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. REv. 543 
(1962); HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 20.4 (1956). 
20. For a perceptive discussion of goal clarification see McDOUGAL, LASSWELL & VLASIC, 
LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE 141-90, 404-06 (1963). The authors' categorization and 
definition of the five sanctioning goals of prevention, deterrence, restoration, rehabilitation 
and reconstruction, supra at 404-06, is particularly relevant for the study of the scope of 
liability. 
21. For example, study of workmen's compensation laws is likely to develop insights 
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the various decision-makers to expand legal responsibility or 
contract it? Is the value position of the parties a significant 
factor? Their status as individuals, corporate entities, business 
enterprises, pressure groups, or governmental agencies? Their 
motives or objectives? The strategies they employ? The social 
utility of their conduct?22 
III. Conditions Affecting Decision-What environmental fac-
tors affecting parties, the decision-makers and the decisional 
process itself are relevant to the resolution of proximate cause 
questions? Here one might include, for example, data drawn 
from disciplines such as sociology, psychology, political science, 
economics and the physical sciences as well as private, industrial 
and governmental reports, in order to shed light on the factors 
which might be expected to exert influence on future determina-
tions of the application of proximate cause doctrines.23 
IV. Prediction and Appraisal-Whither Goeth? In light of past 
decisions and relevant conditioning factors, what is likely to be 
the future direction of the doctrine of proximate cause? Is 
foreseeability and the circle of risk under Cardozo's approach 
likely to be expanded to create absolute liability? In what 
areas? What have leading scholars suggested about future 
applications of the doctrine? Have they taken relevant condi-
tions into account? 
Based on these predictions, will the preferred values and 
policies already outlined be served or disserved by future devel-
opments? 
V. Alternative Solutions-If it appears that the doctrine of 
proximate cause is not likely to serve the preferred goals already 
articulated, what changes in doctrines or institutions might 
better serve those goals? Here detailed comparison and analysis 
of existing recommendations should be undertaken. Specific 
consideration might also be given to the following questions: 
1. Who ought to make various decisions about the scope of 
565 
into the extent to which the community is willing to deviate from the requirement of close 
causal relationships between act and harm in order to fulfill other important goals, while 
examination of the social security laws will reveal that conflicting goals may be resolved 
by resort to non-judicial machinery wherein causation is deemed irrelevant. 
22. In general, what is being called for here is an examination of the relevance to 
decisions of each element of a community process in which participants with widely differ-
ing characteristics, with differing objectives and with varied resources (base values) inter-
act in many situations, and in which such interaction results in various kinds of value 
deprivations. 
23. The most obvious examples of the kinds of non-legal material which may tend to 
influence decision in the development of legal policy relating to automobile transportation 
are NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED (1965) and O'CONNELL & MYERS, SAFETY LAST (1966). 
Perhaps materials from the humanities should be included in this list of conditioning 
factors. I see (dimly, perhaps), some utility in examining ALBEE'S WHO'S AFRAID OF VIRGINIA 
WOOLF as a basis for understanding the factors surrounding scope of liability for inter-
spousal torts and adultery. 
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liability-judge, jury, administrative board, legislature or 
others? 
2. What detailed factors ought to be taken into account 
in making those decisions? 
3. If the issues involved in determining scope of liability 
are to be subject to community judgment, as by a jury, what 
changes can be suggested in the communications used by the 
judge to advise the jury of its function? 
II. SCOPE OF THE COURSE 
The law of torts, as currently conceived, purports to deal mainly with 
the process by which a claimant, alleging that he has been wrongfully 
deprived of a value or values, seeks personal redress against the deprivor. 
So far as can be ascertained from the content of most of the teaching 
materials in the field, both the nature of the deprived value and the 
characteristics of the parties-person, group or government-are ir-
relevant in determining the scope of the course. Thus, for example, the 
typical torts casebook treats, inter alia, of injuries to or interferences with 
real and personal property, the human body, the mind, the reputation, 
and relationships of all kinds. 
Unfortunately, however, certain kinds of value deprivations, those 
of major concern to contemporary society, are not treated at all in this 
course, or are relegated to a few pages hidden in the back of the case-
book. I refer to claims by those who are deprived of access to various 
value processes, as well as to the values themselves, by virtue of poverty 
or race. How frustrating it must seem to some first-year law students, 
only recently rescended from the height of their involvement in the 
major problems of their society and now turning hopefully to the 
study of law as the instrument of social change and improvement, to find 
themselves thrown out of the battlefield and into the no-man's-land of 
proximate cause, or the difference between trespass and case, or between 
legal intent and motivation, without even a glimmer of hope from the table 
of contents of their casebook or the college catalogue that they will deal 
directly with wrongs caused by the societal "torts" of cultural deprivation 
and racial prejudice. 
I do not suggest eliminating either traditional grounds of tort 
liability or the study of history from consideration by students. Rather, 
I recommend that much of what is studied now under the rubric of torts 
might be deemphasized, perhaps replaced in part by textual materials, 
and that the course should be expanded to include exposure to remedies 
for cultural deprivations (social legislation), violations of civil rights, and 
for workmen's injuries.24 
24. I am willing to concede that more hours might have to be added to the course in 
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III. ARENAS 
It may well be the case, of course, that the traditional limitation of 
the scope of the course in torts was based on the fact that it only pur-
ported to deal with matters within the scope of the process of judicial 
litigation. In view of the volume of value-effecting decisions which take 
place in other non-judicial arenas-decisions in which attorneys fre-
quently participate-such limitation is hardly understandable today. 
In the first place, the vast bulk of traditional tort claims are today settled 
by negotiation. While such negotiation is carried on with reference to 
predictions of probable judicial outcomes, the process of negotiation is 
distinctively different from the process of litigation and involves its own 
techniques, skills and knowledge. All of these are worthy of the law 
student's attention. But further, the dynamics of settlement has a major 
impact upon the ethics of the entire society, and the economics of settle-
ment is inextricably bound up with the effectiveness of legal doctrine 
and policy articulated by the legislature and the courts. Should not the 
student be exposed to these relationships and their effects upon the 
society's values before he is released to develop a vested interest in the 
status quo? Should he not be asked to examine whether and to what 
extent the doctrines and institutions he is studying are operating to 
maximize the society's values, and to think constructively about im-
proving their operation? Or is the curriculum to lend itself to the training 
of practitioners who will accept the existing doctrines and institutions 
as given, however unfairly and unevenly they operate? 
Secondly, a very high proportion of the claims which at common law 
would have been presented in a judicial tribunal, or not at all, are today 
brought before administrative bodies. This is true not only of workmen's 
compensation, but also of other important claims, such as discrimination 
and dependency, as well. There does not seen to be any valid reason for 
failing, in a course purporting to deal with legal remedies for value 
deprivations, to expose law students to the techniques and doctrines 
applied by these tribunals. To exclude consideration of administrative 
remedies from the "torts" course, or even to postpone consideration 
thereof until an elective course in a later year, is to mislead the student 
and give him a distorted view of the manner in which his society deals 
with such deprivations. 
Thirdly, along with administrative agencies the use of arbitration to 
decide disputes over damage claims accounts for a share of the "litigation" 
involving such disputes. The role of arbitration, the rules of decision 
applied in arbitral proceedings, and the effectiveness of such tribunals 
order to avoid superficial treatment of the selected subjects. However, I understand that 
many teachers are now managing-although not without difficulty-to handle the criminal 
law course as expanded by Donnelly and Goldstein within· the time limit allowed for the 
more traditional course. 
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in fulfilling the policies of tort law, are all matters with which the legal 
profession should be concerned, and which should be introduced to the 
law student in any course purporting to deal with the process of adjusting 
claims for value deprivations. 
Fourthly, the course in torts should take into account the fact that 
the lawyer's function, either as advocate of a paid client or representative 
of a community interest, may and sometimes should extend into the 
legislative arena.25 Various widespread value deprivations or social in-
justices will yield more quickly and effectively to improvement in the 
legislative arena than in the judicial. While one may appreciate the impor-
tance of judicial legislation as a means of overturning archaic and unjust 
concepts of tort law, and even agree that the courts have the power to 
make such changes, it must nonetheless be conceded that the rapid rate 
of change experienced in the past couple of decades threatens the integrity 
of appellate decision-making and the respect of the public for appellate 
courts. Courts perform most effectively when applying well-formulated 
policies and prescriptions to specific factual situations; there is much 
creativity required to perform even this task. Legislatures, on the other 
hand, are better equipped to frame policy and to work out details of 
specific policies by establishing standards, procedures and special treat-
ment for exceptional cases. Yet the neophyte lawyer, in his very first 
exposure to authoritative decision-making (and perhaps throughout his 
law school career), is involved almost exclusively with the courts as 
organs of reform and to the legislative process hardly at all. Perhaps, 
therefore, the course in torts ought to include detailed study of successful 
attempts to secure reformative legislation (such as FELA, a selected 
workmen's compensation act, or a comparative negligence statute) includ-
ing the elements of the legislative process in which lawyers played a 
significant role. 
Lastly, a useful purpose would undoubtedly be served by exposing 
first year students, at the outset, to the methods of handling claims 
relating to value deprivations and the relevant doctrine in other countries. 
In the search for solutions to problems created by traditional common law 
methods of handling tort claims, awareness and knowledge of other 
systems and of the advantages and disadvantages of such systems ought 
not to be ignored. Supporters of the law of torts as applied domestically 
are hard-pressed at the moment to withstand the demands for reform 
which are being urged at a burgeoning rate. If judicial institutions are to 
adjust to the needs of the society for fair and prompt redress for value 
deprivations, the experience of institutions with similar purposes in other 
societies should provide helpful ideas and useful alternatives. Further-
more, in an age of rapid communications and increasing movement across 
25. C/., Jones, Objectives and Insights in University Legal Education, 11 Omo ST. L.J. 
4, 8-12 (1950). 
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national boundaries, in depth treatment of foreign legal institutions which 
purport to deal with problems similar to those on the domestic scene 
may evoke understanding and respect for those institutions, and tend 
to break down barriers of parochialism. This would not be the least 
important contribution which legal education could make. 
CONCLUSION 
It is within the bounds of reason to assert that students arrive at 
law schools with pre-cast personalities, perspectives and interests molded 
and set by heredity, environmental conditioning and prior experience 
and resistant to change by exposure to the influence of a few law teachers. 
Even under this pessimistic view, however, the law school may still serve 
the function of developing intellectual skills and understanding of the 
processes of community decision-making sufficient to permit the graduate 
lawyer to perform important tasks for his clients and his society, even 
within the limits of his own predispositions. Unfortunately, it is apparent 
that too many law schools have failed rather miserably much of the time 
even in performing those modest tasks. Every law teacher knows that the 
law, as invoked, applied and even prescribed by lawyers, has fallen far 
short of achieving even the minimal objective of maintaining order. But 
furthermore, in the day-to-day operation of the law of negligence we are 
aware of the widespread operation of the "false claim game" and its 
baleful effects on the ethics of the general population, of routine conspir-
acy between lawyer and physician, of the arbitrary effects of contributory 
negligence and unwarranted exceptions to the requirement that each 
person exercise reasonable care for the safety of others, of excessive 
fees, of justice delayed by harassment and dilatory tactics and, especially, 
of the failure to provide any compensation at all to meet the crushing 
effects of hundreds of thousands of actuarially predictable misfortunes 
which arise inevitably in the operation of an otherwise beneficent indus-
trial society. As to the uncharted wastelands of poverty, prejudice and 
crime, we have been aware for years of failures to provide access for the 
value-deprived to arenas and strategies by which claims to minimal 
standards of dignity and fairness can be aired. And even now, having seen 
dramatic legislative and judicial inroads into the problems of cultural 
deprivation, we entertain serious doubt as to the ability of our profession 
to fulfill the demand for effective representation in support of the newly 
recognized claims. In the administration of our courts and administrative 
agencies we are aware of the high incidence of incompetence and venality 
in our decision-makers and the debilitating effects thereof in terms of 
delay, injustice and indignity. And most importantly, we are fully aware 
of the continuing failure of law and legal institutions to cope with the 
insistent demands for social justice and control of force in the international 
arena. 
The fact that these failures, and others like them, cannot be ascribed 
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solely to deficiencies in the law-trained, does not detract in the least from 
the fact that they are in a better position than most other groups in the 
society to develop and implement effective remedies. What has been 
recommended in this report is a reexamination and restructuring of course 
material to induce the law teacher to take his students far beyond the 
traditional experience of "learning" the content of existing doctrine and 
the ways in which it has been applied, into the kinds of intellectually 
stimulating inquiries, oriented to the policies and effects of the law, which 
could conceivably bring the lawyer and his profession into battlefields 
where justice can be fought for and won on a grand scale. 
